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Theoretical discussions about the possibilities and limitations of Artificial Intelligence could
have a major impact on the future development of computer technologies. However, such
discussions are often based on vague concepts and assumptions. This paper proposes a
conceptual framework for the appropriate presentation of knowledge and problems concerned
with human cognitive abilities as well as the capabilities of computational machines. Within this
context we hold it necessary to observe the diSti!Ction between authentic and functional
cognitive abilities. Although computation is not a plausible way of gaining authentic
intelligence, computational systems do offer virtually unlimited possibilities to replicate and
surpass human cognitive abilities on thefunctionallevel.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Discussions about the possibilities and limitations of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
can shed additional light on the plausibility of different approaches to computation,
and with that, they can have "major consequences" for the future development of
computer technologies [17, p. vi]. However, it seems that many well-known (and mueh
discussed) arguments lack the clarity and precision needed to transcend this level of
rhetoric and to become a necessary complement for empirical analyses and
technological research. The victory of the chess-playing system Deep Blue over the
world's chess champion offers an illustrative example of the tone which dominates in
such arguments. The media presented the event as a threat to human dignity, as if the
designers and creators of Deep Blue were not human beings. On the other hand, Searle
offers a reassuring explanation: "The computer knows nothing of chess ... It just
manipulates meaningless formal symbols according to the instructions we give it" [15,
p. 59]. An explanation such as this of the machine's abilities implicitly assumes that a
chess master's skill consists of something radically different than the ability to
"manipulate meaningless symbols". But Searle gives no explanation about the nature
of the chess master's "meaningful" way of reasoning (or computation) for his/her next
move. Hence, it is not obvious why the claim stated for the computer - that it only
"manipulates meaningless formal symbols" - could not be equally stated about the
world chess champion himself.
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Concepts such as understanding and intelligence - although much used in various
arguments - do not have a precisely defined meaning. Hence, we argue that the
discussion of the relationship between human cognition and machine computation
should start with the analysis of the genesis and essence of the human understanding and
intelligence. Namely, the basic questions that we must face are: Where does
understanding come from, and what does it mean to understand and to act intelligently?
In Section 2 we deal with the problem of subjectivity which is the central problem at the
intersection of the various fields of scientific interest. In Section 3 we propose the idea of
the three world s - the physical world, the world of subjective states, and the world
created by humans - which offers a conceptual framework in which the problems
concerning cognition and computation can be expressed and discussed in an appropriate
way. In Section 4 we discuss the basic problems and limitations of AI in terms of this
three-world ontology. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between authentic and
functional cognitive abilities; we c\aim that authentic intelligence is out of the reach of
purely computational systems, though on the level of functional intelligence, the
performances of computer systems shali be more and more difficult for humans to keep
up with. It must be noted that we will not discuss the symbolic and the connectionist
approach to AI separately, since we be\ieve that both approaches face the same basic
problems (see e.g. [3], [Il] and [12]).
2. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY
The standard approach to science assumes that reality is objective in the sense that
neither its existence nor its structure depend on the viewpoint of a particular observer.
Scientific knowledge deals with things which could exist without being known, and is
expressed in away which is equally accessible to every (sufficiently qualified) human
being. We can say that science speaks of phenomena from the neutral (or third-
person's) point of view. On the other hand, subjective mental states seem to be a
different kind of phenomena in an ontological and epistemic sense. Namely, mental
states can only exist as someone's state, and they are really known only to the subject
whose states they are. Neural activities that manifest themselves as pain could (in
principle) exist and be observed without being experienced, but the pain itself could
not: it exists only if and as experienced. Nage\ c\aims that the subjective is "an
irreducible feature of reality", and that "it must occupy as fundamental a place in any
credible world viewas matter, energy, space, time and numbers" [7, pp. 7-8].
Churchland stresses that the taxonomy of physical science has some limits, and that it
reaches these limits "at the subjective character of the contents of consciousness" [2, p.
196]. That does not mean that mental states must be something non-physical, but only
that the present scientific taxonomy cannot express what these states are like from the
unique perspective of the subject that has them. And as subjective states, they do not
have any other way of existence. In this context, positions about the nature of mental
states are divided into two basic views: physicalism and property dualism. There are a
few variants within each of these two basic views, but none of them really solves the
problem. There are also authors who reject both views, but do not offer a coherent
view oftheir own.
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2.l. Physicalism and property dualism
Physicalism claims that mental states can be ontologically reduced to physical
states of the brain, and thus expressed in the objective (third-person) language of
science - firstly, in the language of neurology, and then in the language of physics.
Copeland admits that physicalism is "supported only by faith", or more precisely, by
the fact that other theories seem less plausible or at least less "comfortable". Copeland
says, "an irreducibly mental dimension that sticks out of an otherwise physical
universe like a sore thumb - is unpalatable to us. lt offends against our expectation that
nature is a harrnonious, integrated affair" [3, p. 179]. In essence, physicalism excludes
the subjective from the scope of the discussion, but in doing so it does not solve the
problem of how to deal with the "offensive" fact that the universe does contain
subjective states of people like you and me. On the other hand, property dualism
claims that subjective mental states can be neither ontologically reduced to the physical
nor expressed by the taxonomy of physics. To know everything about the physical
processes going on in the brain does not mean that you know anything about the
experience of pain or joy, or about the taste of a !emon. However, by accepting the
irreducibility of conscious mental states, property dualism faces the (seemingly
unsolvable) problem of the relationship between the physical and the mental
"dimensions" ofreality.
Physicalism does not solve the problem of the subjective states by their reductive
eiimination; and property dualism does not solve the problem either, since it cannot
explain the relationship between subjective states and their objective sources. To solve
the problem of the relationship between the mental and the physical we need a
radically new understanding of the basic phenomena in the world, and a radically new
taxonomy. Penrose claims that there is simply no room for conscious mental states
within the current scientific world-picture. He holds that "we must look to a new
physics" which would make it possible to find a scientific explanation of
consciousness [9, p. 183]. Penrose makes such an attempt by trying to discem the
source of the mental at some physical level lower than the neural level. However, his
attempt remains within the realm of physicaiism. Shimony claims that a new theory of
mental phenomena should attribute "mentalistic properties" to the most primitive
entities in the universe: that is, to a kind of monads, whatever they may be [16, p. 153];
Chalmers [1] also speculates along the same lines. However, the basic problem of how
to speak about the subjective dimension of reality by means of the objective language
of science remains unresolved. Hence, the primary question is not whether machines
can think - and therefore be; or, whether to be means to be a computer - but is instead
the question of how to speak about subjective phenomena in a scientific fashion at al!,
since the scientific taxonomy is intrinsically objective. The mystery of the subjective
dimension of reality is primarily of a conceptual nature, and we do not really know
how to solve it.
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2.2. Searle and the mind-body problem
Searle claims that a taxonomy which speaks of mental and physical properties as
radically different kinds of properties is wrong and misleading. He claims that
subjective states are ontologically irreducible to brain states (as property dualists do),
but he insists that his view is not a property dualism. He claims that there are a lot of
properties in the world, and that it is a mistake to count them, because "we live in one
world, not two or three or twenty-seven'' [I5, p. 88]. However, Searle's "one world" is
not the one of physicalists, since he insists that conscious mental states are not
ontologically reducible to physical states of the brain. It seems that Searle believes that
his one-world view can avoid the difficulties of both views, i.e. of physicalism and of
property dualism. However, it seems to me that his position is incoherent.
Searle claims that "consciousness has a first-person or subjective ontology and so
cannot be reduced to anything that has third-person or objective ontology". He says
that it is not possible to reduce "feelings to neuron firings" or "neuron firings to
feelings", because in the first case we would leave out the subjectivity and in the
second case the objectivity of the phenomenon [15, p. 212]. However, Searle holds that
such an ontological irreducibility does not mean that there is some "really important"
difference between the properties of this one world. Moreover, he "hopes" that he has
"made it clear" that we can accept the "irreducibility of consciousness" without
accepting that there are "two ontologically different sorts of realms", or at least "two
different sorts of properties in the world" [15, p. 195]. In short, Searle's peculiar
position can be reduced to the following: (1) "consciousness has a first-person
ontology", and (2) it "cannot be reduced to anything that has third-person ontology";
however, Searle cannot accept (3) that there are "two different sorts of properties in the
world", because he would then satisfy the definition of property dualism. And that is
exactiy what he does not want to do.
Searle justifies his position by the fact that consciousness - although irreducible to
biology - nevertheless is a biological (i.e. physical) phenomenon: hence, its ontological
irreducibility, by itself, need not imply that consciousness is a property of a "different
sort". Searle says: "consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, property of the
brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property of systems ofmolecules" [13, p. 14].
Of course, with such definitions ("mental, and therefore physical"), everything can be
made of the same "sort". But it is not clear what such a solution by definition could
accomplish, since it does not solve but only hides the problem of the relationship
between the mental and the physical. Indeed, the perennial problem of the relationship
between the properties of "different sorts" for property dualists, for Searle became the
problem of the relationship between the two subclasses of properties of the same sort.
But the problem is the same. Let us say here, that it is not forrnally inconsistent to
proclaim that all the phenomena of the world are of the same "sort". However, if
mutual ontological irreducibility between disjunctive subclasses of phenomena is not
enough to say that these phenomena are of "different sorts", then one must ask what
such an ontology is good for.
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Finally, Searie does accept that there is some "really important" difference between
the entities of the one world. However, he holds that the really important difference is
not the one between the mental and the physical but the one between those entities
which exist independently of the observers and those which are dependent on
observers. Observer-relative entities, such as social institutions, functions and values,
depend on consciousness for their existence, because they are created by humans and
they exist only if recognised by humans. Consciousness itself is not observer-relative,
since it is "a real and intrinsic feature of certain biological systems" [15, p. 211].
However, although Searle emphasises this "really important" ontological difference
between the two cIasses of phenomena, he nevertheless sticks to his one-world view, in
which everything is of the same (pjysical) "sort". For example, he says: "There is no
physical-chernical description adequate to define 'restaurant', 'waiter', 'sentence of
French', 'money', or even 'chair' and 'table', even though all restaurants, waiters,
sentences of French, money, and chairs and tables are physical phenomena" [14, p. 3].
In short, everything is physical but it cannot be described adequately by the language
of physics. Searle says he "dislikes the old Cartesian terminology", and hence, instead
of the old terminology, introduces the distinction between "nonmental brute physical
facts and mental facts" ("mental" intended here as physical, of course). However, he
admits that these two basic categories may not "exhaust all the kinds offacts"; namely,
"if there are mathematical facts, for example, they would not be included in this
taxonomy" [14, p. 122]. In Section 3, we discuss a three-world ontological framework,
which does not solve the problem of subjectivity itself, but does allow amore
appropriate way to speak about subjective mental states as well as about the facts of
mathematics.
3. THE THREE-WORLD FRAMEWORK
A minimal requirement which an ontology should satisfy is to provide a conceptual
framework within which we can speak appropriately about known (or, in principle,
verifiable) phenomena. In this section we argue that an adoption of the three-world
ontological framework makes it possible to express and discuss the problems of human
cognition and computation in the most appropriate way. This ontological framework
could be regarded as both realistic and conceptual, since there are factual and cognitive
reasons for the assumption that there exist three basic and mutually irreducible kinds of
phenomena.
We propose to cIassify all phenomena into three ontologically different realms of
worlds: the physical world, the world of subjective states, and the world created by
humans. The idea of the "three worlds" is attributed to Popper, although he says that
this terminology "stems from Frege" [10, p. 105]. Popper's basic ideas about the three
worlds are clear, but he treats many problems only scantily or unsuitably, so they must
be considered open. We assume that to the physical world (worldJ) belong all naturai
phenomena up to - but not including - the phenomena of consciousness as a boundary
case. Although consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it is that peculiar and unique
natural phenomenon which at the same time also comprises a new world for itself
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(world2): the world of subjective states, such as pain, desire, love or anger. The world
created by human s (world3) contains everything that has been created by conscious
human beings (although not all the entities from world3 have to be created
consciously). World3 contains abstract entities such as numbers and theorems as well
as all forms created by humans. Forms have an autonomous existence; however, they
are not etemal (in the Platonic sense), but are created by humans and (often) imposed
on the physical world. For example, a desk conceived of as a piece of wood belongs to
the physical world; however, if it is conceived of as a desk, in a functional or aesthetic
sense, it is a creation of world2 (the conscious mind) and belongs to world3, the world
created by humans. The same holds for a computer: the computer on my desk is a
physical object, but what makes that "heap of atoms" on my desk a computer is the
form imposed on it by humans.
In the context of the unsolved problem of subjectivity, the question of the
relationships between the three worlds does not have a simple solution. According to
Popper, consciousness "plays the main role in the causal chains" that lead from world3
to worldl. He says: "The abstract part of world3 has so far never exerted a direct
influence upon worldl. ... The link is always forged by consciousness, by world2
(Perhaps this will be different one day.)" [15, p. 24]. Popper's arguments are not
precise enough to be simply accepted or to allow a clear confutation. In any case, the
tree-world ontological framework does not, by itself, solve the problem of "links"
between the three worlds, nor does it seem that this problem has some obvious
solution. We hold that entities of world3 cannot have a "direct influence" on worldl
since "the abstract" cannot do anything by itself. Furthermore, Popper does not pay
enough attention to the problem of delineation between the three worlds; he says:
"reality consists of three worlds, which are interconnected and act upon each other in
some way, and also partially overlap each other" [10, p. 8; my italic]. A lack of
precision such as this creates various difficulties for him. Penrose is one of the few
authors that accepts the three worlds ontological frame; he interprets the basic idea in a
peculiar way, but he does not solve any of the problems which are immanent to such
an ontological framework. He holds that the three worlds are mutually "profoundly
dependent", but that the connections between them are "mysterious": "There is
something distinctly mysterious about the way that these three worlds inter-rei ate with
one another" [9, p. 139]. But instead of dealing with the drawbacks of Popper's and
Penrose's versions of the idea of these three worlds, let us express our basic positions
in amore precise way.
Firstly, we assume that the three worlds are disjunctive; they do not overlap, nor
are they mutually ontologically reducible. Furthermore, we assume that the realm of
the physical is causally closed; and we know no other causal relations than the physical
ones. Hence, it is possible to speak coherently of causal relations only on the level of
the physical world. It seems that such aposition implies that, for example, music
cannot affect my physical behaviour; or perhaps that my conscious deliberation about
my next move cannot have any effect on my choice. However, the proposed position
does not imply such consequences; all it claims is that causal effects take part only in
the physical world. Music can have an impact on behaviour, but only when instantiated
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by means of the physical world, and only through the physical impact of its
instantiation on the neural system (through listening to it). Being conscious of some
situation does impact a decision; however, the conscious state itself emerges from
some neural processes, which were triggered and are influenced only by physical
causes. And from these processes new mental states are constantiy emerging.
Therefore, all causal impacts take part ins ide worldl .
3.1. The role of consciousness
The proposed three-world ontological/conceptual framework can be considered as
an extension of the epiphenomenalism. According to epiphenomenalism, mental states
are products and manifestations of brain activities, but mental states (as subjective
phenomena) do not have any causal impact on these activities. There are claims that
whether epiphenomenalism is true or not is an empirical question, although "it is
notoriously hard to think of decisive tests for or against it" [5, p. 136]. Flanagan
discusses the notorious experiments of Benjamin Libet, which show that there are
electrical activities taking place in the brain about a second before the time when the
subject believes he or she made a conscious decision to perform an act. In other words,
the specific neural activities which lead to an act notably precede the agent's being
consciaus of the fact that he or she was going to perform that act. In the context of
these experiments, "if you imagine that consciousness is something which does
something", says Penrose, "then you are presented with almost a paradox" [9, p. 135].
However, Flanagan insists that it is "extremely implausible" that subjective awareness
"plays no significant causal role", although he admits that it is hard to say "exactly
what role it plays". Flanagan concludes that all disputes about epiphenomenalism "are
matters to be settled in empirical court" [5, p. 151]. However, we believe that before
entering the "empirical court" we should know exactly what we are contesting.
Namely, the current scientific taxonomy does not allow us to speak about any "causal
role" of an entity that is not physical. Hence, if conscious mental states are not
reducible to anything physical (e.g. to brain states), then no "empirical court" can say
anything substantial about the "causal role" ofthese conscious mental states.
The position advocated here claims that a conscious mental state (as subjective and
irreducible to the physical) cannot be said to cause anything by itself; what causes
something is the brain state whose features and manifestation are the conscious state
itself. Therefore, when we say that a conscious mind "creates" or that it "imposes a
structure" , we wish to say that the causal impacts take place on a physical level. In
other words, it is not consciousness as a subjective state that creates by itself, but the
physical system must be conscious to be able to fear, desire, think, understand and
create.
3.2. Discovering and creating
Creation is a result of the human capacity for abstraction and generalisation (which
is based on observed phenomena from worldl), as well as of the attempts to express
and articulate specific subjective states. We claim that scientific theories are creations
of the human mind; we create theories, and we then evaluate them on the basis of the
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effects we manage to obtain from these theories. To world3 belong not only
mathematics, science, and technological devices, but everything that has been created
by humans by means of some system of representation, as well as these systems of
representation themselves. Examples of these types of things are social structures,
customs, works of art and social symbols, which are created by humans and exist on
the basis of same system of representation. We claim that entities of world3 cannot
create by themselves; when instantiated by worldl , they only explicate that which has
already been implicitly created by their very creation. For example, an implemented
program can produce symbols, shapes, colours or sounds; but its outputs were
implicitly created by the very creation (and implementation) of the program itself,
although many of the outputs may not be created with a specific intention or a purpose.
Contrary to this position, Penrose holds that world3, or at least mathematics, is not
a human creation, but exists by itself; consequently, we can only discover entities of
this world and not create them. Furthermore, Penrose conceives of the physical world
as something "emerging out of the ('timeless') world of mathematics" [9, p. 2].
Concerning scientific theories, Penrose says that "Einstein revealed something that was
there", because "the mathematical structure is just there in Nature, the theory really is
out there in space". But Penrose also claims that Einstein's discovery of the General
Theory of Relativity "was not motivated by any observational need but by various
aesthetic, geometric and physical desiderata" [9, p. 25]. Hence, it seems that Penrose's
position is not coherent, unless he presupposes that there is some strange coincidence
between Einstein's aesthetic "desiderata" and the "structure" of the physical world.
Popper holds that the two opposite positions can be reconciled, since "they are both
right". He claims that while, for example, the infinite series of natural numbers is our
creation, the problems concerning prime numbers are not our creation: we discover
such problems in an objective world which we have created, but which became
"objectified, detached from their creators and independent oftheir will" [10, p. 26]. We
hold that Popper's attempt at reconciling the two positions was not successful. Created
entities also have features which were not created on purpose, which are often not
obvious, and which could be discovered later, or perhaps will remain undiscovered
forever. But all those features which are intrinsic to some created entity were created
with the very creation of the entity itself. Hence, if we accept, as Popper does, that the
infinite series of natural numbers is a human creation, then we should also accept that
all features of the series, as well as all the possible problems concerned with it, are
human creations. For nothing would be a problem ifnobody tried or desired to solve it.
4. UNDERSTANDING AS PROBLEM SOLVING
The question of the relation between functional capacities of computational
systems and authentic features of human beings cannot be resolved in terms of outside
effects, but we must take into account internal motivations, since no behaviour can be
said to be intelligent without taking into account its motivations. Popper stresses that
all living beings are constantly preoccupied with solving problems; they are trying to
improve their situation, or at least to avoid its deterioration. Popper claims that
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consciousness was a problem-solving feature of the living system right from the start:
"the original task of consciousness was to anticipate success and failure in problem-
solving and to signal to the organism in the form of pleasure and pain whether it was
on the right or wrong path to the solution of the problem" [10, p. 17]. Conscious beings
encounter and create: they encounter success and failure, satisfaction and frustration,
joy and sorrow; they create myths, religions, arts, and sciences in order to explain,
resolve or celebrate the mystery of existence. A conscious being creates in order to
reduce fears, produce pleasure, communicate feelings, overcome loneliness and obtain
wholeness. It is internal tension that triggers acting and creating - the tension which
springs from the subject's awareness of his own finitude, loneliness, anxiety and
meaninglessness, as well as from the desire for integration, meaning, and harmony [8,
p. 171]. Authentic intelligence springs from the internal necessity of the system to
solve the problems it encounters; it has been driven by the impulses to avoid the
painful and achieve happiness.
Hawking claims that consciousness is not something that can be measured "from
the outside"; hence, he holds, we should leave consciousness aside, and deal with the
intelligence itself, "which is a quality that can be measured from the outside" [6, p.
171]. It really does seem more feasible to "measure" behaviour rather than a mental
state. However, intelligent behaviour without awareness, observed "from the outside",
is essentially different from intelligence that is aware. The existence of intelligence
without awareness depends - in an ontological and epistemic sense - on intelligence
that is aware, as the only source and measure of every other quality. Because ofthese
very reasons, we cannot speak of the creativity of intelligence, since such intelligence
does not and cannot have any motivation to create: it does not have any aim or any
criterion on the basis ofwhich it could evaluate its own behaviour as creating.
4.1. The Care thesis
The motivational approach to cognition that we propose, argues that thoughts and
intelligent behaviour are not independent of subjective states (moods), neither in the
generative nor in the evaluative sense. A mood opens a specific way for phenomena to
show themselves, and along with that it opens different ways of understanding these
phenomena. This means that aware-Iess cognitive abilities are qualitatively limited and
that they exist only as interpretations made by an aware cognitive system. There are
many successful expert systems, and we argue that there is no obvious limits to the
further improvement of machine abilities and skills within the realm of functional
replication of human cognitive abilities. However, aware-less machines cannot reach
authentic intelligence since for such systems there exist neither the problems nor the
motivation to create. Indeed, we could say that the cognitive abilities of artificial
(aware-less) systems are limited by the fact that they do not have problems. Artificial
intelligence is a human creation, and as such it belongs to world3. On the other hand,
human intelligence is a feature of world2: a feature which could neither exist nor be
evaluated without the existence of the other features of world2, such as desire, fear,
love and anger. Let us sum up the above in the following Care thesis: Human beings,
as aware systems, are essentially determined by anxiety and desires: by care; human
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cognitive abilities spring from care and are shaped by it, and they cannot be fully
replicated by a care-less (aware-less) system. On the other hand, computers, as symbol
manipulating devices, can be said (although not proved) to be care-less systems;
hence, such systems cannot understand, be intelligent and creative in the sense in
which humans are. There are claims that to reach human-like intelligence, an artificial
system should have a complete model of the world. The notion 'complete model of the
world' is rather vague; however, as long as a system does not have any problem (care),
no purely descriptive model of the world seems to be sufficient for authentic
understanding and intelligence.
4.2. The Background thesis
The Care thesis says that a care-less system cannot understand, and be
authentically intelligent and creative. In this context, the question arises, what are the
limits (if any) of the functional replication of human cognitive abilities? It is generally
thought that for successful functional replication of human cognitive abilities, a system
should have a substantial amount of common-sense knowledge. But Copeland
emphasises that the development of a system with common-sense knowledge faces
such huge difficulties on the level of ontology, epistemology, knowledge organisation,
and inference that such an enterprise seems to be "the hardest that computer science
has ever faced" [3, p. 107]. Copeland does not claim that such a goal could not be
reached at all, but he maintains that the idea of creating a system with common-sense
knowledge is not at present within our grasp.
Conceming the possibility of a formal description of human knowledge and
behaviour, Copeland says that it is "certainly true" that his preparing an omelette "can
be described by means of if-then sentences". However, he emphasises that from this
fact it does not follow that his actions are produced by some device in the brain
"scanning through lists of if-then rules of this sort" [3, p. 101]. But that is not relevant
for our purpose, or at the very least not decisive enough. Namely, a behaviour which
can be described in a computable way, can be replicated by computation, regardless of
how the original behaviour was produced. Copeland's criticism of the CYC project is
based primarily on the immense complexity of such an enterprise which aims to build a
knowledge base with relevant (or complete) human common-sense knowledge.
However, sceptical comments conceming the possibility of building such a knowledge
base are based primarily on the Background thesis which claims that it is not possible
at all to give a ful! formal description (e.g. in terms of if-then rules) of a common-
sense capacity such as the preparation of an omelette. Computers, as symbol
manipulating systems, can acquire only that knowledge which can be expressed in
some symbolic language. (Let us mention here that connectionist systems are mainly
software simulations implemented on digital/symbolic computers.) Hence, if the
Background thesis is true, then computers could neither reach authentic intel!igence (as
the Care thesis says) nor replicate an essential part of the common-sense human
behaviour on a functional level.
The Background thesis says that a sentence (or a phenomenon) can assume
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meaning only in relation to some background (context) in which it appears, and in
relation to some background capacities of the subject. A meaning is an implicit
interpretation (mainly unconscious) of perceptions, concepts, sentences, beliefs,
desires, and experiences. Such an interpretation takes place within some background or
other and on the basis of a set of background capacities, which are not themselves
explicitly interpreted. In other words, the Background thesis says that represented
knowledge can exist and function only in the context of some background capacities
which are not and cannot themselves be explicitly represented. Heidegger calls these
(implicit) capacities the "understanding of being", and Dreyfus says that "only if we
draw on the background familiarity that is not in the mind but in the shared practices
can we understand how assertions can pick out objects" [4, p. 269].
The Background thesis implies that there is no way to express (and represent)
human common-sense knowledge by means of a computational system, because such a
system does not have the background capacities on the basis ofwhich it could interpret
the inputs and act (behave) in an appropriate way. However, we believe that the
arguments in favour of the Background thesis are not conclusive, and that the
common-sense knowledge problem, even. if the most difficult one, should be
considered open. So, although it would be very difficult to "teach" amachine all the
background knowledge and capacities which humans need and use (mainly
unconsciously) in the course of an action such as "having dinner in a restaurant", it
seems that each individual"atom" of the background knowledge and capacities which
are needed in such a situation, can be described in a computable form and then also
replicated. Such descriptions could either take the form of sentences (facts and rules),
or artificially realised mechanical skills, or simply "demonstratives" (e.g., "that is a
glass"). Demonstrative knowledge could be based on a set of pattems for all the things
which humans encounter in a given situation. Such pattems could be stored in a
figurative form in the knowledge base of the system. Our background knowledge and
capacities are a kind of unconscious map of our surroundings and skills. It would be
difficult to create such a background map of human expectations and skills for
something and with something so different from humans as computers are. However,
we hold that there is no obvious reason to believe that something like this would be
impossible. After all, our background knowledge and capacities were learned mainly
by the method of trial and error. And our leaming starts with some (rather humble)
predisposition, but with nearly no knowledge or skills.
Arguing for the Background thesis, Searle says that the literal meaning of the
sentence "She gave him her key and he opened the door" does not "block" the
following interpretation of the sentence: "He opened the door with her key by bashing
the door down with the key; the key weighted two hundred pounds and was in the
shape of an axe" [14, p. 131l. It is true that such an interpretation of the sentence
cannot be "blocked" by the literal content of the sentence, but only by the fact that we
have Ita certain sort of knowledge about how the world works" and Ita certain set of
abilities for coping with the world" [14, p. 131]. But we claim that there is no evidence
that such abilities could not be simulated by an artificial system. After all, why do we
ourselves not expect somebody to open the door with the key "by bashing the door
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down with the key"? Probably only because we learned that keys are usually used in a
different way. Finally, the fact that humans know how to behave in a given situation
without consciously following some explicit rules of behaviour, does not mean that
human behaviour could not be described by a set of rules and replicated by an artificial
system. And such a system should then be able to "cope" in the given situation in the
same way humans do, at least at the level ofbehaviour or functioning.
5.SUMMARY
The problem of the subjective dimension of reality is primarily a conceptual
problem. We do not know how to express (represent) subjective phenomena in a
scientific fashion, as scientific taxonomy is intrinsically objective. None of the present
positions about the ontological status of conscious mental states can really solve this
problem. In this context, we argue that the three-worJd ontological framework offers a
basic conceptual framework in which the probIems concemed with cognition and
computation can be expressed and discussed in the most appropriate way, although the
solutions to so me of these probIems seem to lie beyond the horizon of our current
knowledge. Discussions conceming intelligence and understanding are usually limited
to the level of behaviour or functioning of the system; contrary to that, we claim that
these phenomena should be observed and defined in terms of their origins and
motivations. Human authentic cognitive abilities originate from care and are
permanently shaped by it. Hence, these abilities cannot be fully replicated by care-less
(aware-less) systems. On the other hand, the arguments in favour of the Background
thesis are not conclusive, and there is no obvious limit to further improvements of
machine capacities within the realm of functional replication of human cognitive
abilities. There is actually no reason to expect that computational systems could acquire
some new qualities which would be radically different from those that such systems
have had from their very beginning. However, we must expect that computational
systems will continue to exceed human functional capacities in various new fields of
human activity. In this context, the claims that machine capacities are "meaningless"
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Mario Radovan
JEZIK, RAČUNANJE I INTELIGENCIJA
Sažetak
Teorijske rasprave o mogućnostima i ograničenjima umjetne inteligencije mogle bi imati bitan
utjecaj na budući razvoj računalnih tehnologija. Međutim, takve rasprave često se zasnivaju na
nejasno definiranim pojmovima i pretpostavkama. Ćlanak predlaže jedan konceptualni okvir
koji otvara mogućnosti za primjereno predstavljanje znanja iproblema vezanih uz čovjekove
kognitivne sposobnosti, kao i mogućih dosega računalnih strojeva. U tom kontekstu držimo
l3
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nužnim razlikovati autentične i funkcionalne kognitivne sposobnosti. lako samo računanje ne
izgleda kao put koji bi mogao dovesti do autentične inteligencije, računalni strojevi pružaju
praktički neograničene mogućnosti reproduciranja i nadmašivanja ljudskih kognitivnih
sposobnosti nafunkcionalnoj razini.
Ključne riječi: računanje, subjektivnost, razumijevanje, mišljenje, inteligencija, tri svijeta,
teza brige, teza pozadine/okruženja.
14
